Nazi War Crimes Research Report

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Chapter One

Early Investigations (U)

declassified and released by

CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPT I 0N3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT
DATE 2004 2006

Former Nazi Adolph Eichmann’s dramatic capture in Argentina and his well-
publicized war crimes trial in Israel made many Americans realize that some Nazi war
criminals had not been brought to justice before the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg or the numerous other postwar trials. 1 Some of these criminals had actually
taken up residence in the United States. The Immigration and Naturalization Service,
charged with the enforcement of American immigration laws, appeared powerless to act
on allegations of wartime criminal activity committed by now- American citizens or
resident aliens. (U)

In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, many Americans grew disillusioned with
the US government. The specter of deliberate coverups by Federal authorities related to
Nazi war criminals did not seem so farfetched as one scandal after another erupted in the
1970s. Charles R. Allen, a journalist and editor of The Nation , was among the first
Am eric ans to ^question the presence of Nazi war criminals in the United States. In a series
of articles (later republished as Nazi War Criminals Among Us), Allen uncovered a
n umb er of individuals with Nazi pasts in the United States. Allen’s activities attracted
the attention of US intelligence, leading the CIA to open his mail from the Soviet Union
in a clandestine program known as HTLINGUAL. 2 (S)

1 a summary of the Army’s less famous war crimes trials can be found in Frank M. Buscher,
The US War Crimes Trial Program in Germany, 1946-1955 (New York: Greenwood Press,

1989). (U)

2 Allen learned about the Agency’s illegal letter opening program in 1981 when the CIA
released its records in response to his Privacy Act request in 1978. Allen filed suit against the

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Elizabeth Holtzman, a Democratic member of Congress from Brooklyn, soon
became the chief critic of the government’s policies concerning the presence of Nazi war
criminals in America. Elected in a stunning victory in 1972 as the youngest woman to
hold office in the US Congress, she earned a national reputation on the House Judiciary
Committee during the Watergate hearings two years later. Starting that same year,
Holtzman also spearheaded the movement to uncover the extent of the government’s
involvement with Nazi war criminals. Holtzman and Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania, the
Democratic chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and
International Law, demanded that the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
provide updated reports on the Service’s investigations of Nazi war criminals. The
representatives also pressed the Department of State for better cooperation in working
with foreign governments to obtain evidence against suspected war criminals. 3 (U)

In May 1974, Holtzman condemned a new INS Nazi war criminal task force in
New York as having conducted its investigations with “appalling laxity and
superficiality.” Holding news conferences in Washington and New York, Holtzman told
the press that “despite the ‘high priority’ nature of I.N.S.’ investigation, its administration

-^CIA^and the US goyemment for violation of his constitutional rights later that year and he also
"submitted an administrative tort claim. The court denied his HTLINGUAL suit.because the
statute of limitations had expired, but the Federal government settled the suit for $1000 in
damages and $66 in legal fees. The government, however, admitted no liability. See Charles R.
Allen, Jr. v. United States of America and the Central Intelligence Agency, Civil Action CV-81-
2606, in Office of General Counsel Records, Job C- J , Box 1 , CIA ARC. Interestingly,
Oleg Kalugin, a Soviet KGB officer posted in New York under journalist cover and later a major
general, claims that he provided Allen with material to use for his book. Oleg Kalugin with Fen
Montaigne, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage Against the West
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), pp. 54-55. (U)

3 Holtzman’s activities as one of the leading proponents of the Nazi war criminal investigations
are found in Saidel, The Outraged Conscience, pp. 104-121. See also, Elizabeth Holtzman with
Cynthia L. Cooper, Who Said It Would Be Easy?: One Woman ‘s Life in the Political Arena (New
York: Arcade Publishing, 1996). (U)

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and conduct can only be described as haphazard, uncoordinated, and unprofessional.” 4
By the end of the year, Holtzman complained that the promised INS investigations had
fizzled. 5 The INS project control office, a one-man operation, had proven simply
incapable of directing full-scale investigations as well as coordinating with other
government agencies and foreign countries. 6 (U)

Frustrated by the poor progress on the part of the INS, Holtzman’s subcommittee
suspected that other agencies of the US Government deliberately obstructed the Nazi war
criminal investigations. 7 The Central Intelligence Agency soon became a target because
of the perception (largely fostered by two highly publicized Congressional investigations
in 1975) that it was a “rogue elephant.” 8 In the fall of 1976, for example, Eilberg and
Holtzman questioned the commissioner of the INS whether the CIA had shielded at least
one man suspected of war crimes from prosecution. Reacting to a published report, the
two members of Congress found “the willingness of the CIA to employ and contact the
Immigration Service on behalf of a person alleged to have committed war crimes under
the Nazis an intolerable affront to the decency of the American people.” Congress
demanded to know the extent of the Agency’s communications with the INS and whether

4 Ralph Blumenthal, “Rep. Holtzman Calls US Lax on Nazi Inquiries,” New York Times , 21
May 1974, p. 8. (U) N

5 Ralph Blumenthal, “Drive on Nazi Suspects A Year Later: No US Legal Steps Have Been
-=T3ken,” 'New 'YorkTimes, 23 November 1974, p. 48. (U)

6 Ryan, Quiet Neighbors, pp. 52-53. (U)

7 “Nazi War Criminals: Chronology of Activities of the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Citizenship, and International Law,” provides a detailed account of the Subcommittee’s interest
in the topic during the years 1974 through 1977. Chronology found in DO Records, Job C.

3 Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

^For further detail about the various investigations, see Harold P. Ford, William E. Colby as
Director of Central Intelligence 1973-1976, CIA History Staff, 1993, (S) and Gerald K. Haines,
The CIA and Congress: Years of Change 1966-1980, CIA History Staff draft manuscript, 1993,
(S). Senator Frank Church’s “rogue elephant” comment gave credence to the public’s perception
that the CIA was an agency out of control. For further information on the “rogue elephant”
illusion, see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1989), pp. 193, 208, and 214-215. (U)

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the INS had previous contact with other Federal organizations, including the Office of
Strategic Services. 9 (U)

Starting in 1976, the Agency began to work with the INS on the Nazi war criminal
investigations after it received the first request to trace suspected Nazi war criminals. On
19 October 1976, Lucien N. Nedzi, Democratic congressman from Michigan and then
chairman of the House Armed Services Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, asked

v CIA’s Legislative Counsel, to determine the “flap potential” of the CIA’s
contact with 141 “war criminals” known to INS “who might be subjected to
reinvestigation and possible deportation.” 10 Working from limited information (initially
a simple list of names), both the Office of Security and the Directorate of Operations
determined that they possessed records on a number of these individuals, including
documents that indicated that the Agency had employed at least a dozen of these subjects
over the years. 1 1 (S)

Even before Nedzi had finished reviewing the name traces, Congress ordered an
investigation by the General Accounting Office. 12 Years of foot-dragging by the INS

^Elizabeth Holtzman and Joshua Eilberg to Leonard F. Chapman, Commissioner, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 15 October 1976, in DO Records, Job C -71 Box 1, Folder 1,
CIA ARC. (C> _ "

IF "legislative Counsel t£_^ Chief, DDO/Information Services

Agency. Contact with War Criminals,” 26 October"! 976, (S), in DO Records, Job C_

%

Backs

Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (S)

-7 -■ «•

^jphief, External Inquiries Section to Chief, IP/Reference Branch,

, ♦ _ a ti J : m... n. n i / p.i I r\nr-t / n \ _ t

“Background Information on Alleged Nazi War Criminals,” 16 February 1977, (S), enclosing
j ap Chiqf, Security Analysis Group, “Alleged Nazi War Criminals in the

^United States,” 21 "DEcember 1976, (C), in DO Records, Job CL 71 , Box 8, Folder 154, CLA
ARC' See also unsigned, Memorandum for Record, “Search to Detennine Any Agency
Connection with Individuals on IN&S List of ‘Alleged Nazi War Criminals,’” 19 November
1976^in the same job as above. (S)

^ Assistant Legislative Counsel to Special Assistant for External

Oversight, “Request bytfieHouse Judiciary Committee for Agency Documents Related to Nazi
War Criminals Immigrating to the United States,” 21 March 1977, OLC 77-1076, (C), in DO
Records, Job H- 71 Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (C)

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and, indeed, by the entire Federal government, prompted Rep. Eilberg, as chairman of the
House subcommittee, to request the General Accounting Office “to determine if
Immigration personnel deliberately obstructed active prosecution of these cases or
engaged in a conspiracy to withhold or quash any information in its possession.” 13
Although Eilberg opened the investigation in January 1977, Frank C. Conahan, Associate
Director of the GAO’s International Division, did not formally approach CIA for its
cooperation until September of that year. 14 (U)

The First GAO Investigation (U)

The CIA, the State Department, the INS, and the FBI jostled with both GAO and
the House Judiciary Subcommittee over arrangements to handle “third agency” material
contained in the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Three agencies (the
CIA, the FBI, and the State Department) refused to grant GAO investigators direct access
to INS records if they contained documents from their respective agencies. ^
f~ tae point of contact in the Directorate of Operations working with the GAO

investigation, met with other agency officials, GAO investigators, and Congressman
Eilberg in April 1 977(,. J“made clear that such documents would be reviewed by

^4he Agency to e xc ise any references to source, methodology, collection, or operations”
before the GAO investigators could inspect them. 16 Under the guidelines established by

13 1978 GAO Report, pp. 4445. (U)

14 Frank C. Conahan, Associate Director, International Division, General Accounting Office to
Office of the Comptroller, 2 September 1977, Compt 77-1334, in DO Records, Job c. -=7
Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

^Various Office of Legislative Counsel journals for 18, 23 February, 18 March, and 5 April
1977, (C), provide details of conversations between CIA, GAO, and the House Subcommittee for
access to CIA records. See DO Records, Job C_ _J Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (C)

1 t- 3demorandum for Record, “GAO’s Investigation of Immigration and

Naturalization Service’s Handling of the Immigration into the US of Alleged Nazi War

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the INS and GAO, the investigators coordinated directly with individual agencies about
reviewing third-agency documents. 17 The CIA and the GAO did not reach a formal
understanding regarding access to classified Agency material and its use until April
1978-only a month before the GAO issued its report. 18 (S)

In November 1 977, the GAO launched its formal examination of the Central
Intelligence Agency when it submitted a list of 1 1 1 persons to the Agency. 19 The GAO’s
names, essentially an abbreviated version of the list given to the Agency by Congressman
Nedzi in 1976, consisted of INS cases of suspected Nazi war criminals residing in the
United States. The GAO placed particular emphasis on two suspects, Edgars Laipenieks
and Tscherim Soobzokov, both of whom had already attracted substantial media interest.

(U)

The Agency responded to GAO’s request a month later, promising, “we will
cooperate to the fullest extent possible in this investigation.” 20 Upon finding records of

Criminals,” 6 April 1977, OLC 77-1368, (S), in DO Records, Job C- . Box 8, Folder 154,
CIAARC^" \ was formally appointed CIA’s point of contact following ChVs official
notification of the investigation by GAO in September 1977. See{_, i , Comptroller

to DDO, “GAO Review of Evidence of Fraudulent Entry into the United States of Alleged Nazi
War Criminals,” 14 September 1977, Compt 77-1334, and^' f , Office of the

Special Assistant to the DDO for External Oversight to? ~j, Office of the Comptroller,

“GAO Review of Evidence of Fraudulent Entry into theTJnited States of Alleged Nazi War
Criminals,” 27 September 1977, both documents in DO Records, Job C~ ^ Box 8, Folder
154, CIA ARC. (S)

copy of“ Availability of Immigration and Naturalization Service Files to GAO in

Connection with its Investigation of IN&S Delays in Institution of Denaturalization and
Deportation Proceedings Against Alleged Nazi War Criminals,” which outlines the general
procedures for access to INS records, is found in DO Records, Job C , Box 8, Folder

154, CIA ARC. (U)

€ '"^Acting Legislative Counsel, CIA, and Victor L. Lowe, Director, General

Government Division, GAO, “Memorandum of Understanding between the General Accounting
Office and the Central Intelligence Agency,” signed 5 and 7 April 1978, in DO Records, Job C
A , Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

1 °Conahan, GAO to Office of Legislative Counsel, 3 November 1977, in DO Records, Job C_
J Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

to Conahan, 6 December 1977, OLC 77-4776/a, DO Records, Job C _3 Box 8,
CIA ARC. (U)

F(^3erT54, ■

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any of the 1 1 1 suspects, the Agency prepared a summary of the information on each
individual for Daniel F. Stanton and John Tipton, the GAO’s primary investigators. The
two investigators, in turn, determined which records to examine in greater detail and
informed^ ^of their requirements. Agency reviewers then performed

“appropriate sanitization to remove personal identities, intelligence sources and methods,
and any other information not related to your inquiry” from the relevant documents.
Stanton and Tipton reviewed the sanitized copies at CIA Headquarters and took notes of
the records, subject to another CIA review and sanitization. In keeping with the “third
agency” rule established by INS and GAO, other documents found in the Agency’s
records, such as Army material, were not shown to the GAO investigators, although the
Agency referred these records to their originating office. 21 (U)

Congressional interest in the GAO’s investigation, coupled with a separate and
somewhat haphazard INS investigation, tested the Agency’s ability to cooperate with the
General Accounting Office. Not willing to let the GAO conduct its own independent
investigation, Congressman Eilberg wrote DCI Stansfield Turner on 4 November 1977
requesting “a detailed report” on the same 1 1 1 individuals that the GAO was already
investigating. 22 Consequently, the Agency permitted two Congressional staff members
of the House Subcommittee, Arthur Endres and Peter Regis, to look at the material under
.teyiew by.GAO’sJStanton and Tipton. 23 With two investigations now underway, the

21 Ibid. (U)

22 Eilberg to Turner, 4 November 1977, OLC 77-4817, in DO Records, Job c. 73 , Box 8,

Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

2 ( T c <j> • DCI Security Officer, “Request for Certification of Security

Clearances,” 1$ November 1977, "OLC 77-5029, (S), in DO Records, Job c_ — u Box 8,

Folder 154, CIA ARC. (S)

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Agency provided a detailed summary of the Agency’s records on the 1 1 1 suspects to the
GAO and House in mid-December 1977 24 (S)

While the GAO and House Subcommittee reviewed CIA’s records (both sets of
investigators examined Agency material in late 1977 and again in early 1978), the
Immigration and Naturalization Service tried to enhance its bruised reputation by
establishing the Special Litigation Unit (SLU) to investigate and bring to trial Nazi war
criminals. Formed in the late summer of 1977, SLU, under Martin Mendelsohn, did not
really get off the ground until the spring of 1978 when it launched a new investigation in
the wake of the GAO and House Subcommittee 25 By the spring of 1 978, the CIA
juggled three separate investigations, all essentially examining the same material and
asking similar questions. (U)

As early as February 1978, the House Subcommittee pressed the GAO to testify at
a public hearing the following month about the progress of the investigations 26
Congressional pressure mounted throughout the spring of 1 978, forcing the GAO to wrap
up its investigation in April. Later that same month, CIA officials, primarily^

reviewed the preliminary draft report and added two

L — - ^ \ — _j

paragraphs emphasizing that the CIA did not knowingly employ any war criminals during
a period of intense need for intelligence about the Soviet Union. 27 (S)

24 A series of memoranda provide a summary of the Agency’s activities during this time. See

especialljC. \ to/

Tand

[ Office of Legislative Counsel,

^ ( ^ y w ~ >

‘Alleged Nazi War Criminals m theUnited States,” 15 December 1977, (S), in DO Records, Job
C -3 Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (S)

2 ^The formation of SLU is discussed in the 1978 GAO Report, pp. 26-27. (U)

^Memorandum for the Record, “Nazi War Criminals,” 3 February 1978, (S), in DO
Records, Job C. Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (S)

27 Copies of the GAO drafts with portions highlighted by CIA reviewers are found in DO
Records, Job ’ C Box 8, Folder 169, CIA ARC. See also<£" Jto£ flAO

_Draft Report of War Crimes Investigation,” 21 April 1978, OLC 78-0357/8, (S), ant j7 J ' f o
/ ^21 April 1978, (S), in DO Records, Job C J2 Box 8, Folder 154, clA ARC.

iTe Office of Security also expressed concerns about the language of the draft, especially the

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The General Accounting Office submitted to Congress its formal report,
Widespread Conspiracy to Obstruct Probes of Alleged Nazi War Criminals Not
Supported by Available Evidence-Controversy May Continue, on 17 May 1978.
Regarding the CIA’s involvement, the GAO found that, in its search for information on
1 1 1 individuals, the Agency had no information on 54. Of the remainder, CIA
acknowledged having a more substantial relationship with 22 individuals. (U)

The Report’s Backlash (U)

The report unleashed a storm of criticism about the use of Nazi war criminals by
the United States Government. Rep. Joshua Eilberg publicly blasted the CIA and FBI.
“This report makes it clear,” Eilberg announced, “that the CIA and FBI were more
interested in using these people and getting information from them, than in conducting
any background investigation as to their wartime activities or pursuing allegations that
they were war criminals.” He also had harsh words for the Agency and commented, “I’m
appalled that so many of these individuals had direct contact with our government
officials, and that some actually were assisted by the CIA in entering this country.” 28 The
GAO report made national headlines with reporters emphasizing the CIA’s role regarding
-^Nazi^war criminaK In contrast, the investigation’s original intent, to ascertain the cause
of the lax response by the INS, attracted less attention from the media. 29 (U)

GAO’s criticism of the use of prepared summaries and sanitized documents by the CIA and the
FBI. Sef \ to Chief, Security Analysis Group, “Nazi War Criminal

Investigation,” 4 May 19787lfc), in same job as above. (S)

28press Release, “Report to Eilberg Charges Nazi Ties with CIA, FBI,” 17 May 1978, in DO
Records, Job £L_ Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

29 For example, see Associated Press release by Jay Perkins, undated and untitled, which
formed the basis for report “CIA Used Alleged Nazis, GAO Says,” in The Washington Post , 17
May 1978. See also Maijorie Hunter, “Utilization of Nazis Laid to CIA and jVew York

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The GAO Report was also notable for its hesitant conclusion that there was no
evidence of a conspiracy to obstruct justice. The GAO tried to protect itself by stating on
the cover of the report that it did not enjoy full access. “GAO’s investigation was
hindered by the effect of the passage of time on the availability of information and limited
access to agencies’ records.” 30 (U)

The Central Intelligence Agency took this criticism with some disappointment.
From its standpoint, the Agency felt that it had been forthright in revealing its files to the
GAO and the House Subcommittee. DDCI Frank C. Carlucci wrote the General
Accounting Office on 18 May 1978 to protest the report’s conclusion.. “We would like
the record to show that we were prepared at all times to make complete files
(appropriately sanitized to protect intelligence sources and methods) available for review
by the investigators to validate their conclusions.” 31 (U)

Trying to shore up relations on Capitol Hill, DCI Stansfield Turner wrote to
Edward Boland, the chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
in June 1978. Turner assured the congressman that the Agency “has never in any way
been involved in any attempts to protect alleged Nazi war criminals.” He offered the
members of the oversight committee full access to CIA’s records relating to the GAO
investigation. 32 (U)

New Hearings (U)

Times, 17 May 1978. Copies of various articles found in DO Records, Job d _3 Box 8,
Folders 1 54 and 1 69, CIA ARC. (U)

30Cover statement, 1978 GAO Report. For further details, see the Report’s “Scope of Review,”
pp. 4-6. (U)

31 Carlucci to J.K. Fasick, International Division, GAO, 18 May 1978, OLC 78-0357/E, in DO
Records, Job C -3 Box 8, Folder 154, CIA ARC. (U)

32 Tumer to Boland, 17 June 1978, OLC 78-0357/G, in DO Records, Job C. Box 8,

Folder 155, CIA ARC. (U)

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Eilberg convened his subcommittee in July 1978 to hear new testimony from the
GAO, various researchers, and former officials responsible for immigration policy and
enforcement. Following up on the hearings conducted in August 1 977, this second round
of hearings focused on the published GAO report, but also delved into questions of actual
US immigration policies after the war, including the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. 33
In discussing the report with Victor L. Lowe, GAO’s director of the General Government
Division, Eilberg and Elizabeth Holtzman questioned why the House Subcommittee had
better access to the CIA’s records than the GAO investigators. Lowe responded that the
CIA’s summarized reports were unsatisfactory. “Bear in mind,” Lowe reminded the
Subcommittee, “we could only ask for the documents supporting the summary they gave
us. We do not know what they put in the summary. You wouldn’t know what to ask for,
you see, so the summary document is what you had to go by.” 34 (U)

Charles R. Allen, the journalist who in the early 1960s had exposed the fact that
Nazis came to the United States, was the star witness of the 1978 hearings. He grabbed
headlines again by criticizing the Agency for its failings ranging from illegal spying on
American citizens, drug testing, and criminal actions in Vietnam. “Against such a
background,” Allen dramatically exclaimed, “need there be any surprise that, as I have
charged and can demonstrate, some 10 US Intelligence Agencies-headed by the CIA and
the FBI-have over the past 33 years utilized at least provable Nazi war criminals who,
taken together, are charged with responsibilities for the genocide of some 2.4 million

33 US Congress. House. Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of
the Committee on the Judiciary. Alleged Nazi War Criminals. 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 19-21 July
1978 (hereafter cited as the 1978 Hearings). See also US Congress. House. Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Committee on the Judiciary. Alleged Nazi
War Criminals. 95th Cong., 1st sess., 3 August 1977 (hereafter cited as the 1977 Hearings). (U)

34 1978 Hearings, pp. 20-21. (U)

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women, children, and men between 1939 and 1945?” 35 By the end of the three days of
hearings in the summer of 1978, the House Subcommittee branded the Central
Intelligence Agency’s intransigence as a major reason why the GAO investigation had
failed 36 In Eilberg’s opinion, “it is just regrettable that so much time and man-hours and
money was expended and we have so little to show for it.” 37 (U)

The House Subcommittee (with Eilberg and Holtzman as its two leading
advocates) demanded that the US Government provide more answers about its use of
Nazis after World War II. In late June 1 978, Eilberg and the other Subcommittee
members signed a memorandum of understanding with the CIA to permit House staff
members to examine Agency material. Similar in nature to the agreement reached with ‘
the GAO in April, the memorandum codified the working arrangement between the
CIA — primarily the DO — and the House investigators. 38 In mid-August, Eilberg called a
meeting of representatives from the CIA, the GAO, and the Departments of Defense,
Justice, and State that established the guidelines for Eilberg’s investigation and hailed the

35 Ibid.,p. 61. (U)

^Ironically, the GAO dispatched its two investigators to visit CIA immediately prior to the
summer hearings. The investigators reexamined some Agency records and discussed some of the
questions that the House Subcommittee had provided in advance. The CIA’s use of the summary
reports was not mentioned in the House’s preliminary questions. Se^ 3 Memorandum for
Record, “General Accounting Office Meeting,” 10 July 1978, enclosing “Points to be Covered at
Vu^rrGAOMdetingV’’ in : DO Records, Job CL L3 Box 8,_Folder 155, CIA ARC. A CIA official
attended the hearings and provided some feedback. See/^ ^ Memorandum for the

Record, “House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law
Hearings on Alleged Nazi War Criminals, 19-20 July 1978,” 20 July 1978, OLC 78-0357/28, in
the same job as above. (U)

37 1978 Hearings, p. 29. (U)

3^ J Acting Legislative Counsel, to Eilberg, 22 June 1978, enclosing

Memorandum of Understanding between the Director of Central Intelligence and the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, in DO Records, Job
CL 23 Box 8, Folder 155, CIA ARC. An account of a meeting between CIA and the House
concerning the MOU is found in/ \ Memorandum for Record, “Meeting with Chairman

Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.), House Judiciary" Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and
International Law,” 19 June 1978, OLC 78-2409, in the same job as above. (U)

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CIA’s Memorandum of Understanding with the Subcommittee as a model working
tool. 39 The Subcommittee’s new investigation retraced the steps of the GAO
investigation in examining records of the 1 1 1 suspects. James Black, an investigator
from the GAO (who had not worked on the earlier investigation) was detailed to assist the
House in examining the Agency’s records. Like the GAO study, the House still had to
submit to the CIA’s rules (as stated in the Memorandum of Understanding) that allowed
investigators to review documents only after removal of names of CIA personnel or other
information concerning sources or methods. 40 (S)

The Holtzman Amendment (U)

Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman assumed the chair of the House Immigration
Subcommittee after Eilberg lost his bid for reelection. Her rise to Congressional
leadership was enhanced by growing Congressional interest in Nazi war criminals and in
the previous fall when Pres. Jimmy Carter signed the amendments to the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1 952. 41 The new law incorporated the language and intent of the
1948 Displaced Persons Act and the 1953 Refugee Relief Act to “exclude from admission

3?. 'Assistant Legislative Counsel, Memorandum for Record, “Multiagency

'^Meeting ’with Hous? Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law
Ch ai r ma n Joshua Eilberg (D., Pa.) on 17 August 1978,” 17 August 1978, OLC 78-0357/30,
enclosing list of participants, statement by Eilberg, and “Scope of Subcommittee Investigation,”
in DO Records, Job C~ Box 8, Folder 155, CIA ARC. (U)

^ ~^hief, Policy and Coordination Staff, Policy Guidance and Legal Affairs, Litigation
Branch, to Chief, Information Management Staff, “Nazi War Criminals,” 1 November 1978, (S),
in DO Records, Job Cl -3 Box 8, Folder 155, CIA ARC. (S)

41 Growing Congressional interest in Nazi war criminals in response to constituent requests can
be seen in letters from Sen. Max Baucus about Nicolae Malaxa, a Romanian financier with ties
to both the Nazis and communists. Likewise, Rep. Lamar Gudger also expressed concern about
CIA’s ties to war criminals. He called for the DCI to support the Congressional and Justice
Department investigations. See various correspondence in DO Records, Job C_ -13 Box 8,
Folder 155, CIA ARC. (U)

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into the United States aliens who have persecuted any person on the basis of race,
religion, national origin, or political opinion, and to facilitate the deportation of such
aliens who have been admitted into the United States.” 42 Holtzman’s bill closed a
loophole that had hindered the government from taking legal action against these
individuals. 43 (U)

Holtzman hailed the new law and exclaimed, “the presence of Nazi war criminals
in the United States constitutes the unfinished business of World War II. By taking an
forthright stand against allowing these mass murderers a haven in this country, we will
not only reaffirm our commitment to human rights but we will be making it clear that
persecution in any form is repugnant to democracy and to our way of life.” 44 (U)

As the new Subcommittee chair, Holtzman immediately pushed for a stronger
organization within the Federal government to investigate and prosecute Nazi war
criminals. In late March 1979, the Associate Attorney General bowed to her wishes and
announced that the Department of Justice would transfer the Special Litigation Unit from
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice. At the same time, the Justice Department planned to expand the new
organization’s staff, now called the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), to nearly 40
personnel with a budget of $2 million. 45 Martin Mendelsohn remained as the head of the

42 United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 95th Congress-Second Session

1978, vol. 4: Legislative History (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 4700-4716. (U)

43 The 1948 DP Act and the 1953 Refugee Relief Act excluded those immigrants from
entering the United States who “have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations”
(language derived from the Constitution of the International Relief Organization). The
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, however, did not incorporate this wording; thus, the
government could deport war criminals admitted under the 1948 and 1953 acts, but not those that
entered the United States under the 1952 law. (U)

44 Congressional Quarterly, Almanac 95 th Congress 2 nd Session... .1978, vol. XXXIV
(Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1979), pp. 8-9. (U)

45 A.O. Sulzberger, Jr., “Agency Studying Nazis is Upgraded,” New York Times , 29 March

1979, P. A18. (U)

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new OSI until early May 1979 when Walter J. Rockier, a prominent lawyer and a former
prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, accepted a temporary position as the
director of the fledgling office. 46 (U)

The Holtzman Amendment, in combination with the Office of Special
Investigations, transformed the Federal government’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and
deport Nazi war criminals. In the deportation of aliens residing in the United States, the
Office of Special Investigations had to show that the defendant had advocated, assisted,
or participated in Nazi-sponsored persecution on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, or political belief. In denaturalization cases of American citizens, however, OSI
still had to prove that the defendant obtained American citizenship by means of fraud or
misrepresentation of a material fact. 47 (U)

By the end of the 1970s, Congressional interest had forced the investigations to
accelerate-although not without some confusion and misunderstandings, as seen by the
GAO and Congressional investigations during 1977-78. Over the next ten years, the
Office of Special Investigations would handle a number of important cases while the
General Accounting Office conducted another controversial investigation. The Central
Intelligence Agency clearly remained the focus of these new investigations. (U)

46 For biographical information on Rockier, see Adam Bernstein, “Nuremberg Prosecutor
Walter Rockier,” The Washington Post, 12 March 2002, p. B6, and “Walter Rockier, War-
Crimes Agency Chief, Dies at 8 1 ,” New York Times, 2 1 March 2002, p. A3 1 . (U)

47 A fact is considered to be material when, if it had been revealed at the time of immigration
or naturalization, it might have induced the US Government to institute further investigation that
could have revealed that the individual was ineligible for an immigrant visa and/or US
citizenship. Information provided by Dr. Elizabeth B. White, historian with the Office of Special
Investigations, 3 September 1996. (U)

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